Sir Adrian Fulford’s report into the July 2024 attack in Southport that killed three young girls does not pull any punches. He concluded that the UK’s safeguarding model had completely failed, with no agency taking lead responsibility. He referred to “an inappropriate merry-go-round” of state agencies, none of which took responsibility for the risks posed by 17-year-old Axel Rudakubana.

There were red flags about Rudakubana for several years before the attack. This included him carrying knives to school with the stated intention to use them, attacking fellow pupils, telling police that he had considered poisoning people, and a browsing history obsessed by violence and death.

The Southport inquiry reveals the pivotal role of schools in these situations – they have deep knowledge and understanding of their pupils and families. But of course, they cannot do it alone. Their powers and duties are rightly rooted in education.

The weakness in the system is not what schools are doing in relation to safeguarding – it is that when they attempt to escalate concerns (in this case via three Prevent referrals), they are not always picked up.

While Fulford praised schools’ efforts to intervene, the inquiry found that there had been gaps in information-sharing between schools, and overdependence on individual designated safeguarding leads.

Schools, broadly, have a deeper understanding of a child’s behaviour than other agencies involved with safeguarding. They see their pupils for 190 days a year, while interactions with other agencies are occasional or even one-off. But they are frustrated by different thresholds for intervention in other agencies.

We saw this with Southport. Rudakubana attended school almost 100% in years 7 and 8. He and his family were well known to the school. Fulford reported extensively on the levels of interaction between all three secondary schools which Rudakubana attended. But staff from one school felt that they were going round in circles, as no other agency would take responsibility for the risks which he was presenting. That included local authorities, the police and social care. Arguably, the voice of schools should be given more weight more than they are now when multiple agencies are invited to discuss a case.

How schools’ jobs are getting harder

Within a school, the designated safeguarding lead is responsible for managing referrals to statutory agencies, maintaining confidential records and helping staff recognise and report safeguarding concerns of any nature, from child protection to radicalisation. A 2024 government consultation revealed growing pressure in the system, with greater numbers of more complex referrals. Typically, schools will have pupils from more than one local authority area which complicates the role. While training is mandatory, it is of variable quality.

Schools must discharge their legal Prevent Duty. Teachers need to look out for the signs of radicalisation and engagement with extremist ideology. It goes way beyond traditional subject boundaries and exam teaching. And all schools are inspected by Ofsted on how effectively they keep their pupils safe.

The Southport inquiry reveals that this is becoming an even more complex role.
Rudakubana’s school referring his case to Prevent, the specialist police officers did not escalate concerns, because Rudakubana did not present a coherent ideology. While his conversations with teachers and online behaviour suggested obsessions with violent death, he was not obviously aligned with any ideology. There was no political or religious agenda per se.

His motivations were unclear and confusing, yet they were sufficient for the three schools involved to raise concerns with other agencies numerous times from 2019-24.

This suggests that Prevent is out of step with the issues schools deal with on a day-to-day basis. Referrals where no ideology was identified now comprise the largest number of Prevent referrals . A review of Prevent and its interactions with schools in now overdue.

We also know that Rudakubana had a form of autism which the inquiry found “manifestly fell into the cohort of those … whose individual characteristics mean that their autism does carry an increased risk of harm to others”.

It is important to state that there is no evidence that autistic people are more likely to commit violent acts than neurotypical people. However, specific autistic traits can make some more susceptible to non-violent extremism, radicalisation or the adoption of extremist views, particularly in online environments. Working to affect change with autistic pupils who have deeply embedded obsessions with violence requires the highest level of specialist skills.

In the English school system, professional development and provision has not kept up with the demand generated by increased numbers of pupils with complex needs. The government is currently consulting on proposals to overhaul the Send system in England.

Schools’ responsibilities in relation to safeguarding have grown in recent years. At the same time, they find themselves dependent on other organisations to fully discharge their duties. This is the fundamental weakness in the system. While schools did not share information between themselves fully effectively, their subsequent efforts to alert other agencies to the risks Rudakubana presented were not taken seriously.

The chain is only as strong as its weakest link. It will be of no great solace to school leaders whose work is praised by Fulford to know that if their advice and warnings had been heeded by all the other agencies, the Southport killings would not have happened.