Religious violence is often presented as a distinct, more dangerous category of violence—one that flows from absolutist beliefs, irrational passions and primordial hatreds. Humanists have sometimes accepted this framing, opposing themselves to “religious fanaticism” in the name of rational peace. Yet this dichotomy is deeply misleading: Violence labeled “religious” is typically co-produced by multiple institutional spheres—polity, economy, law, kinship—as well as religion and its narratives. A humanist analysis committed to clear thinking and equal concern for all persons cannot afford to ignore these institutional entanglements. From this perspective, the “myth of religious violence,” as described by William Cavanaugh, is not merely a conceptual error; it is a moral and political problem. It legitimates the secular nation-state as rational and peacemaking, while casting religious others—often Muslims—as uniquely prone to irrational violence. A humanist ethics grounded in universal dignity should resist this asymmetry, subjecting both “religious” and “secular” violence to the same critical scrutiny. Consider for a moment that when a bomb hits a mosque, a synagogue or a church, people often call it “religious violence.” When …